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Abstract
Intersections are hazardous places. Threats arise from interactions among pedestrians, bicycles and
vehicles, more complicated vehicle trajectories in the absence of lane markings, phases that prevent
determining who has the right of way, invisible vehicle approaches, vehicle obstructions, and illegal
movements. These challenges are not fully addressed by the “road diet” and road redesign prescribed
in Vision Zero plans, nor will they be completely overcome by autonomous vehicles with their many
sensors and tireless attention to surroundings. Accidents can also occur because drivers, cyclists and
pedestrians do not have the information they need to avoid wrong decisions. In these cases, the missing
information can be computed and broadcast by an intelligent intersection. The information gives the cur-
rent full signal phase, an estimate of the time when the phase will change, and the occupancy of the blind
spots of the driver or autonomous vehicle. The paper develops a design of the intelligent intersection,
motivated by the analysis of an accident at an intersection in Tempe, AZ, between an automated Uber
Volvo and a manual Honda CRV and culminates in a proposal for an intelligent intersection infrastruc-
ture. The intelligent intersection also serves as a software-enabled version of the ‘protected intersection’
design to improve the passage of cyclists and pedestrians through an intersection.
1 Introduction
4,000 New Yorkers are seriously injured and 250 are killed each year in traffic crashes. This is the leading
cause of injury-related death for children under 14, and the second leading cause for seniors. In 2014 Mayor
Bill de Blasio launched New York’s Vision Zero Action Plan seeking to eliminate these injuries and deaths
(New York City, 2018). In the San Francisco Bay Area fatalities from crashes increased 43 percent between
2010 and 2016 to reach 455 killed, of which 62 percent were bicyclists or pedestrians (MTC, 2017). In
California, Vision Zero (VZ) plans have been initiated in Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Mateo, San Jose,
Santa Barbara, San Francisco and San Diego.
Autonomous vehicles (AVs) offer a radically different path to a crash-free urban road network. The widespread
deployment of AVs, with their many sensors and tireless attention to their surroundings, is expected to elim-
inate all 94 percent of crashes involving human error, with no sacrifice of mobility (Waymo, 2018; General
Motors, 2018).
VZ plans focus on dangerous intersections. VZ investments physically modify intersections to limit vehicle
mobility through lane elimination and enforced speed reduction, sidewalk extensions that shorten pedestrian
crossings, and dedicated bike lanes. The aim is to eliminate serious accidents and deaths by restricting




















Intersections also pose a challenging environment to AVs because of the complex interactions among pedes-
trians, bicycles and vehicles, more complicated vehicle trajectories in the absence of lane markings to guide
vehicles, split signal phases that prevent determining who has the right of way, invisible vehicle approaches,
and illegal movements.
The concentration of VZ investments on intersections is to be expected since 50% of all injury/fatal crashes
occur at or near an intersection (FHWA, 2018). The initial safety outcomes of VZ investments were uncer-
tain. An evaluation of 12 NYC streets that received a ‘slow zone’ treatment during 2012-14 found “Overall,
the number of wrecks remained virtually unchanged on those problem corridors, and casualties fell only
4%.” Six of the 12 streets reported a reduction in accidents with injuries and fatalities and six reported
an increase (Hicks et al., 2015). However, the most recent report shows that rigorous enforcement against
speeding, texting while driving and failure to yield to pedestrians, combined with street design improve-
ments including Leading Pedestrian Intervals (LPIs), addressing left turns at intersections and building out
the protected bike lane network, led to a 45% decline in pedestrian fatalities from 2013 to 2017 (New York
City, 2018).
In Fall 2016 the City of Berkeley redesigned the intersection at Hopkins Street and The Alameda. This ‘pro-
tected intersection’ now includes four concrete ‘refuge islands’ that narrow the formerly wide intersection,
so cars must slow down to negotiate a smaller turning radius. The islands guide bicycles as they approach
the intersection and back towards the traffic lane afterward. Pedestrians have a shorter crossing distance.
The result is mixed. Drivers have complained about the increased difficulty turning right. Tire marks have
obscured the paint on the outside of some of the islands, as drivers turn too sharply. At one corner tire marks
record drivers unwilling to wait in a queue to turn right, and go into the bike lane instead. A citizen who has
been crossing this intersection for 17 years said that “squeezing the traffic” into a narrower space makes this
“a stressful intersection” and irritates drivers (Rees, 2017).
VZ plans in Edmonton, Canada have had success. Over a six-year period strict enforcement against speeding
and red light violations resulted in a 12% drop in collisions, and implementing a 30km/h speed zone at all
elementary schools led to a 4% reduction in serious collisions and speed reduction of 12 km/h. Engineering
improvements include left-turn-only green flashing arrow on traffic lights and pedestrian crossing upgrades.
The city has also raised community awareness in traffic safety (City of Edmonton, 2017).
Autonomous vehicles (AV) offer a radically different path to a crash-free city. The widespread deployment
of AVs, with their precomputed street maps, on-board sensors, and tireless attention to the sensor readings,
is expected to eliminate all 94 percent of crashes a to human error, with no sacrifice of mobility.1 The claim
has captured public attention and secured unlimited venture capital. But the claim is unverifiable at present.
In 2016, Waymo reported that its safety drivers disengaged autonomous driving once every 5,000 miles; in
2017 this rate was 5,500 miles. Waymo reports a disengagement only when it identifies the event as having
“safety significance and should receive prompt and thorough attention from our engineers in resolving them”
(California DMV, 2017). Safety significance seems to mean that without the disengagement, there could
have been a crash. Waymo’s reported 5,500 miles per disengagement may be compared with the 500,000
miles per reported accident in the U.S. today.
Advanced AV designs rely exclusively on their sensors and maps and do not communicate with the infras-
tructure or with other vehicles. However, one auto parts supplier has expressed interest in systems with
infrastructure sensing and communication and one manufacturer has announced plans for a connected car
platform (Frost, 2017; Estrada, 2017). In any event, intersections pose a challenging environment to AVs
because of the complex interactions among pedestrians, bicycles and vehicles, more complicated vehicle
1The 94% is misleading. The NHTSA report, based on 2005-2007 data, states the assignment is not intended to blame the driver
for causing the crash (NHTSA, 2008).
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trajectories in the absence of lane markings to guide vehicles, split signal phases that prevent knowing who
has the right of way, invisible vehicle approaches, and illegal movements. AV test reports do not disclose
the number or difficulty of intersections traversed in autonomous mode.
The focus on intersection safety in AV design is also to be expected since, between October 2014 and April
2018, 58 out of 66 or 88 percent of self-reported AV crashes in California have occurred near intersections
(California DMV, 2018). Moreover, a study of these reported accidents also casts doubts on AV capability
to drive collision-free in intersections, at least in the near future (Favaro et al., 2017). On the other hand,
proposals for collision-free intersections, e.g. (Ahn and Del Vecchio, 2018; Rios-Torres and Malikopoulos,
2016) presuppose a highly centralized communication and control and 100 percent AV market penetration.
which will not be realized in the foreseeable future, except in highly restricted environments.
Reported VZ plans and AV tests make no use of the opportunities made possible by infrastructure sensing
and I2V communication that make movement in intersections safer for automobile drivers, cyclists and
pedestrians by reducing the spatial and temporal uncertainty they face. VZ plans appear to be limited to
modification of intersections that constrict vehicle movement, with no role for these opportunities. AV
systems all seek to achieve self-driving with no assistance from the infrastructure (Waymo, 2018; General
Motors, 2018).
This paper argues the case for exploiting the opportunities offered by an intelligent infrastructure. As the
penetration of connected and automated vehicles (CAV) increases, I2V can improve safety even further.
Section 2 explains how intersections are unsafe; section 3 analyzes a revealing accident that could have
been avoided by I2V communication; section 4 describes an approach to using I2V communication to make
intersections safer and section 5 proposes the intelligent intersection based on this approach. Section 6
shows how this approach would avoid the accident of section 3. Section 7 illustrates steps in a procedure
that automates key steps in this approach. Conclusions are collected in section 8.
2 Why intersections are unsafe
Unlike streets with well-defined lane dividers, intersections do not have markers in the pavement that sepa-
rate users and movements. The paths of vehicles, bicycles and pedestrians cross each other within intersec-
tions, creating ‘conflict zones’ and the potential for crashes. So avoidance of crashes requires the movements
of different agents to be separated in time and space. It is impossible to fully achieve this separation and so
the risk of intersection crashes remains.
Traffic signal control provides limited separation because it does not simultaneously give the right-of-way
(green light) to two conflicting movements. Although critical to safety, its effectiveness is often compro-
mised. A driver (or autonomous vehicle) planning a certain movement (say a left turn) can see from the sig-
nal light whether her own planned left turn is permitted, but she may be unable to figure out whether another
conflicting movement (say a through movement by another vehicle or bicycle, or a pedestrian crossing) is
also permitted. That is, the signal light visible to the driver does not provide the complete phase information.
Similarly, a pedestrian or cyclist undertaking a movement may be unaware of a permitted conflicting vehicle
movement. This spatial uncertainty about rights-of-way can be eliminated if the infrastructure provides the
complete phase information.
Furthermore, road users do not rely solely on their current view of the traffic signal. They also predict how
the signal will change in the next few seconds. An accurate prediction of the duration of the current phase
and the upcoming phase can be supplied by the intersection, thus reducing temporal uncertainty about rights-
of-way. This information can be provided by processing signal phase data accumulated at the intersection.
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The information is part of the SPaT (signal phase and timing) I2V message that the SAE has standardized (
CAMP - VSC3 Consortium, 2012). Intersections could broadcast SPaT messages (Ibrahim et al., 2018).
Even when the driver (cyclist or pedestrian or AV) knows the complete phase, her knowledge of the inter-
section state will be limited by the extent to which her view of the intersection is obscured by other users.
If the driver cannot fully see a conflict zone, she must guess whether there is a hidden user undertaking a
movement in the conflict zone. This dilemma can lead either to slow driving that is overly cautious (when
there is no hidden user), or to driving optimistically at a normal speed with greater risk of a crash (because
there is a hidden user). The intersection infrastructure can process sensor measurements to determine the
presence or absence of a hidden user and communicate that to the driver, thereby eliminating the risk of an
overly pessimistic or optimistic assessment (Medury et al., 2017).
Lastly, even when no conflicting movement is present, a crash may occur from the illegal movement of
another car, bicycle or pedestrian. A common example is a car or bicycle running a red light or a pedestrian
crossing against a ‘dont walk’ signal. If appropriate sensor measurements can be acquired and processed
rapidly, the driver could be warned to take evasive action.
In summary, sensor data acquisition and processing at an intersection can provide I2V messages that give
complete phase information, predict the signal phase and timing in the next cycle, accurately assess potential
conflicts, and warn of the danger from traffic violators. Call an intersection with this capability an intelligent
intersection. Upgrading to an intelligent intersection is not cheap. However, data collected at an intersection
can be analyzed to estimate how many crashes can occur. Intersections can be ranked accordingly and
investment can be directed at the most unsafe intersections.
3 An accident
The accident described in this section occurred on March 24, 2017. See Figure 1. Vehicle V1 (Honda CRV)
northbound in the left turn lane of S. McClintock Dr entered the intersection during green, with 5 s left in the
crosswalk timer, stopped, made a slow left turn onto E. Don Carlos Ave, and collided with vehicle V2 (Uber
automated Volvo), southbound in lane 3 of S. McClintock Dr, which entered the intersection on yellow at
38 mph (56 fps).
After being hit, the Volvo continued across the intersection, struck a traffic signal pole, flipped on its side and
collided with Vehicles V3 (Hyundai EST) and V4 (Ford Edge), which were stopped in traffic southbound in
lane 2 of S. McClintock Dr. The self-driving Uber had the right of way and was programmed to enter the
busy intersection at the speed limit while the light was yellow, but a human driver likely would have slowed
down. A witness told the reporter, “All I want to say is it was good on the end of the [Honda] driving toward
us, it was the other driver’s fault [Uber] for trying to beat the light and hitting the gas so hard” (Muoio,
2017).
Four possible errors contributed to the accident. The Uber automated Volvo (V2)
1. may not have known that traffic in the opposing direction was permitted to turn left;
2. did not predict that the light would turn yellow before it entered the intersection;
3. did not consider that the vehicles stopped in the adjacent lanes 1 and 2 prevented it from seeing a
left-turning vehicle until the Uber was within 10 feet of the stop bar and at a speed of 56 fps it could
not come to a stop within 10 feet. (At a deceleration of 32 f/s2, the Uber would stop in 49 ft.)
The Honda (V1) driver
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Figure 1: Left: diagram from the police report of an intersection where a Honda CRV (V1) traveling north
made a left turn and collided with an Uber automated Volvo (V2) traveling south at 38 mph in a 40 mph
zone. After the collision, the Uber Volvo hit a signal pole, and two other vehicles (V3, V4), shown in the
inset. Right: the accident caused heavy damage but no one was seriously injured. Source: (Yoshida, 2017).
4. was occluded by vehicles stopped in lanes 1 and 2 and could only see 10 feet into lane 3 and seeing
no vehicle there, concluded that none was going to cross the intersection; she did not realize that
the occlusion from stopped vehicles prevented her from seeing a vehicle more than 50 feet away
approaching at 40 mph.
Errors 1 and 2 could easily be prevented by a SPaT message that gives the current phase and predicts when
it will end (Ibrahim et al., 2018). Error 3 could be prevented by a calculation of the ‘blind spot’ due to the
occlusion from the vehicles stopped in the adjacent lane, together with an intersection collision avoidance
(ICA) message. Error 4 is difficult to avoid but it could be prevented by a warning sign (Signalized Left
Turn Assist System) proposed in the CICAS program (USDOT; J. Misener et al, 2010) or by an intersection
collision avoidance (ICA) message. The ICA messages could be triggered by strategically placed sensors
within the intersection as described in Section 6.
Notice that errors 1-4 above are due to insufficient information, which places the drivers in a dilemma:
should they be optimistic and proceed at a normal speed and risk an accident, or should they be pessimistic
and slow down or stop.
The accident described above is one of several scenarios that pose dilemmas and induce errors of judgment
on the part of intersection drivers (Medury et al., 2017). Six common scenarios are described below:
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1. RTOR (right turn on red) signal phase confusion and limited LOS (line of sight): RTOR vehicle can
not determine if opposing traffic has the right of way;
2. delayed reaction to pedestrian crossing: RTOG (right turn on green) vehicle needs a couple of seconds
to detect pedestrian walking direction;
3. yellow interval dilemma: the following through vehicle does not know when the traffic signal will
turn yellow, which might trigger a rapid response from the leading vehicle;
4. left-turn alert: LTOG vehicle cannot detect the right turn vehicle; both share the same lane, creating
conflict;
5. limited LOS for pedestrians/bicyclists: vehicle waiting to turn left blocks the LOS of RTOR vehicle,
so it cannot see the pedestrian on the crosswalk;
6. collision with red light violator.
Figure 2 illustrates the six scenarios, all in the same intersection; however, the red-light violation scenario is
captured by a camera at a different location.
Figure 2: Common intersection conflict scenarios. Source: (Medury et al., 2017).
4 An I2V system for intersection safety
The four-step approach developed in this section for an I2V information system makes intersections safer. In
step 1, trajectories of users (cars, bicycles, pedestrians) are grouped into ‘guideways’ corresponding to their
movements within an intersection. In step 2, ‘conflict zones’ are identified as regions where two guideways
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intersect, creating the potential for an accident. In step 3, a procedure is used to determine if a planned
movement can be safely executed with the information made available to the user. This information consists
in what users themselves can sense of the other users in the intersection, together with the SPaT message
from the intersection. The message gives the full current phase and an estimate of the time when the phase
will change. Most conflicts are resolved by step 3. The conflicts that remain are due to blind zones. In step 4,
sensor information provided by the intersection tells whether these blind zones are occupied by other users
or not. Note that steps 1 and 2 are conducted offline, wheres steps 3 and 4 require real time information.
Section 6 illustrates this four-step approach for the Uber accident described in section 3.
The approach is described for a standard four-leg intersection. Upon entering any leg, a vehicle may turn
left, turn right, or go straight, giving in all 12 vehicle movements or phases. The eight non-right turn vehicle
movements are numbered 1 through 8 and denoted φ1, · · · ,φ8, as in the inset of Figure 3 (Federal Highway
Administration, 2008). The signal lights control which phase is active or actuated, i.e. which movements
have the green light. Right turn phases are not numbered, because it is assumed they are always permitted.
Pedestrians can only use crosswalks, so they have four movements, phases P2, P4, P6, P8, parallel to
φ2,φ4,φ6,φ8. Pedestrian movements are regulated by the ‘walk/dont walk’ signal, simultaneously with
the corresponding phases, so P2 gets ‘walk’ or ‘dont walk’ at the same time that φ2 gets ‘green’ or ‘red’,
etc. Bicycles move alongside vehicles, so they have 12 movements as well, actuated concurrently with the
corresponding vehicle movements. (This is a simplification for ease of exposition: pedestrian, bicycle and
vehicle movements need not be concurrent.)
Figure 3 is used to describe the approach.
Step 1. Construct guideways. A trajectory is a path traced out by a vehicle as it moves through the
intersection. (Only legal or permissible trajectories are considered.) A guideway is the bundle of vehicle
trajectories that make the same movement. A guideway starts from a single lane entering the intersection
and ends in a single outgoing lane. There are 12 vehicle guideways corresponding to the 12 phases. For the
rest of this section we focus attention on the single white trajectory of the vehicle making a right turn from
the south in Figure 3. Call this the ego vehicle. Its trajectory is inside the pink guideway of all right turn
trajectories.
The figure shows two other vehicle trajectories in white, one making a left turn from the north (φ5), the
other making a through movement from the west (φ8). Guideways for bicycles are adjacent to those for
vehicles and the figure displays three bicycle trajectories in black, one making a right turn from the south,
another making a through movement from the west (φ8), and the third making a left turn from the north
(φ5). Pedestrian trajectories are confined to the crosswalks, which form the four pedestrian guideways.
Two pedestrian trajectories in yellow are shown (P6 and P8). No bicycle or pedestrian guideway is shown.
We will determine the information needed to make the ego vehicle’s right turn movement safe. The other
movements are analyzed similarly.
Guideways may be mathematically specified or empirically constructed. Mathematically, a guideway for
a particular movement comprises all possible paths joining its entering and exiting lanes, constrained by a
reasonable curvature. The empirical construction of a guideway would use GPS traces or videos capturing
vehicles or bicycles making a particular movement.
Step 2. Identify conflict zones. The seven trajectories – two vehicle, three bicycle and two pedestrian –
all intersect the trajectory of the ego vehicle. The intersections of their guideways with the pink guideway
identify the seven conflict zones that the ego vehicle must cross. From the inset of Figure 3 one can see that
the following describe all the conflict zones involving the ego vehicle:
CZ1 Conflict with right turn bicycle from south;
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Figure 3: A vehicle’s right turn trajectory from the south in white. The guideway of all right turn trajectories
is in pink. Seven trajectories can conflict with the right turn: two other vehicle trajectories in white, three
bicycle trajectories in black, and two pedestrian trajectories in yellow. Trajectories and guideways of non-
conflicting movements are not shown. The inset diagram defines the vehicle and bicycle phases φ1, ...,φ8
and the pedestrian phases P2, P4, P6, P8.
CZ2 Conflict with pedestrian on south crosswalk (P8);
CZ3 Conflict with through vehicle from west (φ8);
CZ4 Conflict with through bicycle from west (φ8);
CZ5 Conflict with left turn bicycle from north (φ5);
CZ6 Conflict with left turn vehicle from north (φ5);
CZ7 Conflict with pedestrian on east crosswalk (P6).
The conflict zones CZ1, · · · , CZ7 can all be calculated ahead of time from a map of the intersection and the
guideways. They are shown in Figure 4 as disjoint rectangles for clarity, although in fact they overlap. The
ego vehicle must safely cross all seven conflict zones.
Step 3. Resolve conflicts. There are three parts to this step which determines which of the seven conflicts
can be resolved. Resolving a conflict means that the ego vehicle can determine whether or not another user
will occupy a conflict zone at the same time as the ego vehicle, resulting in a crash. If the ego vehicle
determines that another user will occupy a conflict zone simultaneously with the ego vehicle, we assume
the latter will use a collision avoidance procedure to avoid the accident; if the ego vehicle determines the
conflict zone is unoccupied, it ignores this conflict zone. Collision avoidance may simply require slowing
down or speeding up without changing the ego vehicle’s path (Ahn and Del Vecchio, 2018).
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Figure 4: The intersection of the seven guideways with the pink guideway yields seven conflict zones, CZ1,
. . ., CZ7. The conflict zones are shown disjoint for clarity, although in fact they overlap.
Part 1. Using signal light visible to ego vehicle. Some of the seven conflicts can be resolved by considering
the signal light as seen by the ego vehicle, using the fact that two conflicting movements never simultane-
ously have the green light. Since the signal light may be red or green, the planned movement is either RTOR
(right turn on red) or RTOG (right turn on green).
(i) Suppose this is a RTOR movement. So phases φ6 and φ1 face a red light and P6 has ‘dont walk’ signal.
Hence conflict CZ7 cannot occur, but CZ1, CZ2, CZ3, CZ4, CZ5, CZ6 remain unresolved.
(ii) Suppose this is a RTOG movement. So phase φ6 faces a green light and P6 has ‘walk’ signal, phase
φ8 faces a red light and P8 has ‘dont walk’ signal. Hence conflicts CZ2, CZ3, CZ4 cannot occur, but CZ1,
CZ5, CZ6, CZ7 remain unresolved.
Part 2. Using ego vehicle’s intersection view. The vehicle must decide from its view of the intersection
which of the remaining conflicts can be resolved. Figure 5 shows a configuration of other potential users in
the intersection. (The following analysis must be carried out for the prevailing configuration.) E is the ego
vehicle making a right turn. U1, · · · , U7 are the other users whose movements conflict with E: U3, U6 are
vehicles, U1, U4, U5 are bicycles, and U2, U7 are pedestrians. O is a vehicle stopped in the left turn lane
next to E and obstructs E’s view so E cannot see U2, U3, U4 (if they are indeed present) but can clearly see
U1, U5, U6, U7. So E can resolve CZ1, CZ5, CZ6, CZ7. However, O prevents E from seeing whether or
not U2, U3 and U4 are in fact present and pose a threat, so conflicts CZ2, CZ3, CZ4 remain.
(i) Suppose E is making a RTOR movement. Then the unresolved conflicts are CZ2, CZ3, CZ4.
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(ii) Suppose E is making a RTOG movement. Then all the conflicts are resolved since U2, U3, U4 cannot
move, and E can safely complete the right turn.
Figure 5: The ego vehicle must determine which of conflicts CZ2, CZ3, CZ4, CZ5 can be eliminated from
what it sees of the intersection. O obscures the triangular region from the ego vehicle’s field of view so it
cannot see U2, U3, U4, hence CZ2, CZ3, CZ4 remain.
Part 3. Using signal phase and timing (SPaT) information. An equipped intersection broadcasts a SPaT
message every 100ms. The message consists of the complete signal phase (i.e. the signal phases faced by
users at all legs) and an estimate of the time when the phase will change. (In an actuated signal phase
durations are not deterministic, and must be estimated (Ibrahim et al., 2018).) We now see how SPaT
information can help resolve conflicts.
Suppose E is making a RTOR movement and cannot resolve CZ2, CZ3, CZ4 because of obstruction by O.
The red signal seen by the ego vehicIe is compatible with the four possible signal light configurations shown
in Figure 6. The ego vehicle does not know which configuration prevails, but discovers it from the SPaT
message. In configurations I and II West-East movement is permitted, so U2, U3 and U4 all can move and
E cannot resolve CZ2, CZ3 and CZ4. In configuration III, only U2 can move, so E cannot resolve CZ2. In
configuration IV U2, U3 and U4 cannot move, so all the conflicts are resolved, and E can complete the right
turn.
Thus upon receiving the SPaT message, it remains for E to resolve either conflict U2 (in configuration III)
or conflicts U2, U3 and U4 (in configuration I). This is done in Part 4.
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The SPaT message will also tell the ego vehicle that its signal will change to green in time T . So after T ,
the vehicle’s movement will automatically change from RTOR to RTOG and, as we have seen, all conflicts
will be resolved. T may be as long as the cycle time, up to 2 mins. The ego vehicle may decide it is worth
waiting for time T to complete its movement. Many AVs today are programmed not to engage in RTOR
movements, e.g. (Reid, 2016; Ackerman, 2017). Waymo AVs reportedly have difficulty with unprotected
left turns (Felton, 2018).
Figure 6: The possible signal light configurations (I-IV) compatible with RTOR movement of the ego vehi-
cle.
Step 4. Detect obstacles in blind zones.
This step is needed only if not all conflicts are resolved and E decides to continue with the RTOG movement.
Suppose configuration I prevails so U2, U3 and U4 all can move and E cannot resolve CZ2, CZ3 and CZ4.
To continue with the right turn, E must be assured by infrastructure sensing that U2, U3 and U4 are not
going to move to CZ2, CZ3 and CZ4 respectively before E moves. Observe that U2, U3 and U4 are all
upstream of their corresponding conflict zones along their guideways. Suppose E will take time τ to traverse
the furthest conflict zone (CZ4 in Figure 4). Call blind zone BZi that part of the guideway from which Ui
can reach CZi in time τ. (This is the ‘backward reachability set’ of Ui in time τ.) The obstacle O has created
these blind zones. The infrastructure should have the capability to sense whether these blind zones are in
fact occupied by users U2, U3, U4. Sensing the absence of users in these areas would be communicated by
an I2V intersection collision avoidance (ICA) message. Upon receiving this message, the ego vehicle would
proceed with the assurance that all conflicts are resolved. If this message is not received, the vehicle should
wait for its signal to change to green.
5 An intelligent intersection
An intelligent intersection implements the four-step approach described above. It has a map of the inter-
section that includes guideways, movements, conflict zones and blind zones; and sensors that detect the
occupancy of these blind zones. The map is constructed offline. The map may be downloaded by connected
vehicles and other users. The intersection software records the signal phase in order to calculate SPaT
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messages in real time, for example using the algorithms described in (Ibrahim et al., 2018). The intersec-
tion broadcasts in real time the SPaT message and the occupancy of the blind zones. These broadcasts are
received by connected users of the intersection.
An intelligent intersection can also detect red-light violators. Figure 7 shows three frames of an intersection
video camera. The camera is triggered by the detection of the intruding vehicle at a high speed traveling
into the intersection during a red signal. The detection took place at least 2s before the vehicle entered the
intersection and could warn the vehicle with ROW. Also shown is a picture of a Google AV after a van
crashed into it as it entered the intersection 6s into red. The Google AV could have been programmed to
avoid the crash with a 2s warning.
car with ROW
Figure 7: Intrusion of red-light violator detected by intersection (source: (Muralidharan et al., 2016)).
Above: picture of a Google AV crash by a red-light violator.
Protected intersection. The intelligent intersection also functions as a limited but flexible protected inter-
section. Protected intersections (Falbo) refer to physical modifications designed to improve the passage of
cyclists through an intersection. Its key features are (see Figure 8):
1. Insertion of ‘refuge islands’ to sharpen turning radius of cars, forcing them to slow down to 5-10 mph
when turning right;
2. Special bike lane setback as they cross the intersection;
3. Forward stop bar for cyclists, far ahead of waiting cars;
4. Special cyclist-activated traffic lights;
5. Advance green traffic signals for cyclists,
6. Turn restrictions for cars, while all turns allowed for cyclists.
Several protected intersections have been built in the U.S. since 2015. The first, in Davis, CA cost $1M
(City of Davis, 2016). Not all protected intersections incorporate the special bike signals. In Salt Lake City,
UT these signals were not added due to the need to install bicycle detection sensors. Similarly, the protected
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Figure 8: Schematic of a protected intersection (https://vimeo.com/86721046).
intersection design in Davis, CA omitted bicycle-friendly signal timing, as it would “cause backups and
could decrease the safety of other parts of the corridor.”
The protected intersection imposes significant mobility cost. As seen in Figure 8 the right turn pockets have
been eliminated so that right turn and through vehicles must share the same lane; the former will block the
latter as they wait to complete the turn, resulting in a significant reduction in the intersection throughput.
This reduction is a permanent imposition even when there is no bicycle traffic or when emergency vehicles
need to travel quickly.
An intelligent intersection can be enhanced to provide several safety benefits. Bicyclists or pedestrians could
put apps in their smartphones that alert the intersection controller of their location and direction thereby
serving as a mobile bicycle or pedestrian sensor. Knowing how many bicycles there are and their desired
turn movements, the controller could adaptively set the duration of the bicycle signal to reduce backups.
The SPaT calculation could be used to signal to cyclists that they should speed up or slow down to avoid
stopping as in the “Flo” system introduced in Utrecht (Metcalfe, 2017).
The cost of an intelligent intersection is relatively small, estimated at $25K to $50K, depending on the size of
the intersection and the extent of preexisting sensing. The safety benefits of an intersection upgrade depends
on the traffic demand. From the map of the intersection one can calculate the conflict zones and roughly
estimate queues to see how frequently blind zones will occur. On that basis one can rank intersections and
target limited funds.
6 Preventing the Uber accident with I2V
We re-examine the crash summarized in Figure 1, assuming that the intersection is intelligent and that one
or both vehicles are connected. The left panel of Figure 9 shows the relevant five vehicle movements and
the pedestrian movement on the crosswalk on the right (phase P6). The left turn movement from the north
(made by the Honda) crosses four conflict zones depicted by squares. The third conflict zone (in red) is the
one that corresponds to the through movement of the Uber in the rightmost lane.
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Figure 9: Left: the relevant movements and conflict zones; Middle: Guideways G1 and G2 create a blind
zone for Honda (H); Right: G1 and G2 create a blind zone for Uber (U).
The guideways of the three northbound through movements are labeled G1, G2 and U, and the guideway
of the left turn movement is labeled H. These are shown in the middle panel. The vehicles in G1 and G2
are stopped so the left-turning vehicle can see them. It can also see the pedestrian crossing. So the only
unresolved conflict is with guideway U. The intersection of H and U is the red conflict zone.
As shown in the middle panel the stopped vehicles in G1 and G2 cut out the red triangular region from the
Honda’s field of view. Hence the Honda would be unable to see the Uber vehicle if it was more than (say)
50 feet from the red conflict zone. Thus the region of guidway U upstream of the red conflict zone upto a
distance of 150 feet is a blind zone for the left turning vehicle. (This calculation is based on the assumption
that the Honda can stop in τ = 3s during which time the Uber can travel 150 feet.) An advance vehicle
detector in the rightmost lane say 200 feet from the stop bar could signal when a vehicle crossed the detector
and occupied the blind zone. The intelligent intersection could broadcast this occupancy message and the
Honda would receive it if it were connected, and stop. But if the Honda was not connected, its driver would
not stop and it would be up to the Volvo to prevent the crash.
As shown in the right panel the stopped vehicles in G1 and G2 cut out the green triangular region from the
field of view of the automated Volvo. Hence the region of guideway H from the stop bar to the intersection
exit is a blind zone for the Volvo. The SPaT message from the intelligent intersection would warn the
Volvo that its signal will turn yellow several seconds in advance. Since the Volvo’s view of guideway H
is obscured, upon receiving the yellow light warning, it would slow down sufficiently as it approached the
stop bar so as to see the Honda in time and stop. Detectors at the stop bar and at the end of the left turn
movement could also determine the presence of the Honda and the intersection would broadcast a message
if no vehicle is detected and the Volvo could continue. However, in the scenario under consideration, the
intersection would not send this message, the Volvo would infer that a vehicle (Honda) is occupying the
blind zone, slow down and stop.
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7 Illustration of intersection intelligence design
Figure 10: Left: Center lines of guideways constructed automatically from the Open Street Map. Right:
Actual guideways, conflict zones, and a blind zone of one conflict zone.
Figure 10 illustrates our procedure for automatically constructing guideways, conflict zones, and blind zones
of intersections. We start by importing a map of the intersection at N First St and Component Drive in San
Jose, CA, from the OpenStreetMap database. This map is not shown. The map gives the lanes of the
intersection. From this we construct the center lines of all guideways. The result is superimposed on a
Google Earth map as shown in the image on the left. A guideway’s center line starts in the center of an entry
lane and ends in the center of an exit lane. The guideways are obtained by “thickening” their center lines as
in the image on the right. Different guideways are shown in different colors. Note the guideways for bicycle
lanes, pedestrian crosswalks and light rail. The conflict zones, which are the intersection of two guideways,
and one blind zone in black are shown as in Figure 9. Details of the code are available in (Toolbox, 2018).
8 Conclusions
Vision Zero (VZ) plans and autonomous vehicles (AV) are two significant approaches to reducing serious
injuries and deaths from road accidents. VZ plans seek to lower the accident rate through physical redesign
of intersections to protect cyclists by separating them from vehicles making turns, by pedestrian-friendly
signal timing such as Leading Pedestrian Intervals, by reducing the number of lanes, and lower speed limits
for vehicles. The redesigns are expensive and appear to make cycling safer and more popular. Rigorous
enforcement of VZ rules have safety benefits. But VZ plans are inflexible and impose significant mobility
costs on vehicle drivers.
Autonomous vehicles (AVs) have attracted praise from transportation departments and finance from venture
capitalists (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2018). The claim is that AVs will eventually eliminate the
94 percent of crashes involving human error, with no sacrifice of mobility. The claim is unverifiable at
present. AVs tested in California reported 40,000 miles of autonomous driving per accident (California
DMV, 2018). In 2017, Waymo reported that its safety drivers disengaged autonomous driving once every
5,500 miles. Waymo reports a disengagement when its evaluation process identifies the event as having
“safety significance” (California DMV, 2017). These reported rates can be compared with an estimated
500,000 miles per accident in 2015 (6M crashes for 3 trillion VMT, (NHTSA, 2016)).
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Intersections present a challenging environment both to urban road users and to AV designers. Unlike VZ
plans that rely on infrastructure redesign and AV control programs that rely solely on its on-board sensors,
this paper makes the case that both efforts will be more productive if intelligent intersections can provide
information that users and AVs lack. An intelligent intersection can broadcast two crucial information mes-
sages. A SPaT (signal phase and timing) message gives the full signal phase (not just the partial view of
the signal that a user or AV has) and an estimate of the time when the signal phase will change. Together
with what road users and AV sensors can see, SPaT eliminates most possible conflicts. The second message
informs an AV what its blind spots are and which of them (if any) is occupied by another user. Computation
of the SPaT message requires real time access to the intersection phase. Calculation of blind spot occu-
pancy requires real time sensing of well-defined regions of the intersection. We have argued that these two
messages can resolve all conflicts within the intersection.
An intelligent intersection has four capabilities. First, it has a GIS map that describes all the lanes, stop
bar locations, and permissible movements. An algorithm can then construct the guideways, conflict zones,
possible queue obstructions at stop bars and blind spots as outlined in Section 7. Second, it has historical and
real time signal phase data that record the time of each phase change. The phase data and the signal timing
plan are used to construct the distribution of the remaining duration of the current phase. This information
is needed to compute the SPaT message. (The phase data itself can be obtained from the controller or its
conflict monitor as in (Ibrahim et al., 2018).) Third, sensors must be installed at strategic locations along
guideways upstream of conflict zones to detect whether a blind zone is occupied. Fourth, the intersection
must be able to transmit the SPaT and blind zone occupancy messages to users and AVs. The easiest way
to communicate would be via a smartphone app. Such an app would be automatically triggered by crossing
a geo-fence around the intersection; it would inform the intersections of the smartphone of a pedestrian or
cyclist; the intelligent intersection would return information or use the presence of the phone to set signal
timing. We estimate an intelligent intersection upgrade to cost about $25,000, based on the cost of the
intersection described in Muralidharan et al. (2016). If intersection traffic data is available one can estimate
how frequently blind zones will be occupied and thereby predict the usefulness of an upgrade. One can rank
order intersections by their utility to direct VZ or I2V investment. In ongoing work we are attempting to
carry out this program for San Francisco.
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